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Approaches to understanding ontogeny that involve physical factors such as flow or deformation have 
intrigued biologists for more than a century. Wilhelm His (1831-1904) favored explanations of 
developing chick embryos based on analogies with mechanical phenomena exhibited by non-living 
materials, such as the folding of rubber tubes (Hopwood 1999). D’Arcy Thompson (1860-1948) 
generated iconic examples with hypothetical changes in morphological shape derived from cartesian 
coordinate transformations based on differential growth rates (Olby 1986). Another famous example is 
Alan Turing’s model of spatially constrained reaction-diffusion mechanisms producing pattern 
formation, such as differential coloration of epithelia or periodic repetitions in leaf structure (Turing 
1952). 
 
In all of these cases, the explanatory reasoning is analogical. If physical forces or mechanisms generate 
specific morphologies in viscoelastic or chemical materials, then similar morphologies in living species 
could be explained sufficiently by physical forces or mechanisms operating on similar materials in the 
developing embryo. The living medusa has a geometrical symmetry so marked and regular as to suggest 
a physical or mechanical element in the little creature’s growth and construction... we seem able to 
discover various actual phases of the splash or drop in all but innumerable living types of jellyfish 
...[these] indicate, at the very least, how certain simple organic forms might be naturally assumed by 
one fluid mass within another, when gravity, surface tension and fluid friction play their part (Thompson 
1942). 
It is suggested that a system of chemical substances, called morphogens, reacting together and diffusing 
through a tissue, is adequate to account for the main phenomena of morphogenesis... certain well-
known physical laws are sufficient to account for many of the facts (Turing 1952).  
 
Although physical explanations never disappeared completely, they were eclipsed toward the end of the 
20th century due to dramatic experimental successes from molecular genetic approaches that 
transformed experimental embryology into developmental biology (Fraser and Holland 2000). The 
sentiment was captured in a NIH proposal review from the 1990s: “The physics of how embryos change 
shape is neither an important nor an interesting question” (quoted in Keller 2002). “For some 
researchers, development can now be reduced to the interplay of cell-cell signaling and transcriptional 
regulation” (Gerhart 2015). 
 
Despite this eclipse, a new dawn of developmental inquiry about physical forces has recently emerged: 
“There has been a renewed appreciation of the fact that to understand morphogenesis in three 
dimensions, it is necessary to combine molecular insights (genes and morphogens) with knowledge of 
physical processes (transport, deformation and flow) generated by growing tissues” (Savin et al. 2011; 
cf. Miller and Davidson 2013). In light of history, what accounts for this new dawn? Why, after all this 
time, is physics (seemingly) gaining a place at the high table of developmental biology? I argue that one 
major factor is the use of physical approaches for investigative rather than explanatory reasoning. The 
capacity of experimental practice to manipulate physical forces surgically, on par with standard genetic 
approaches, is relatively new. As has been argued elsewhere (Waters 2004), scientific knowledge is 
structured by investigative strategies as much as theoretical explanations. The explanatory potential of 
physical approaches to understanding ontogeny has not changed dramatically in recent years; what has 
changed is the precision of physical manipulations to investigate properties of developing systems. This 
has increased practical knowledge about how changes in the values of physical variables affect 
embryogenesis and created evaluative knowledge about what kinds of physical manipulations exhibit 
fecundity for ongoing inquiry. 
 
I illustrate this situation with two examples: fluid flow in vertebrate cardiogenesis and bioelectricity in 
planarian regeneration. The former demonstrates how investigative reasoning using physical 
approaches yields practical knowledge through experimental manipulation on analogy with mutational 
analysis in the genetic approach (Hove et al. 2003). Explanatory analogies between physical and living 
systems largely fell on deaf ears; investigative analogies between physics and genetics turned out to be 
decisive. The latter example bioelectricity exemplifies a novel form of evaluative knowledge: how 
physical variables (e.g., voltage gradients) can be manipulated using the genetic approach (e.g., via 
altered expression of ion channel genes) to yield diverse morphological outcomes (Beane et al. 2013). I 
close with remarks on how this alignment of investigative reasoning between physics and genetics is 
nurturing new controversies about the purported genetic control of ontogeny the predominant form of 
explanatory reasoning in developmental biology (Levin 2014). 
 
